Item Description
"... a strong and stimulating book. It has no rival in either scope or quality. For libraries, history buffs, and armchair warriors, it is a must. For political science students, career diplomats, and officers in the armed services, its reading should be required." -- History"A particularly timely account." -- Kansas City Times"It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley's analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful." -- Perspective
Product Details
- Author: Russell F. Weigley
- Publication Date: 1977-06-01
- Publisher: Indiana University Press
- Product Group: Book
- Manufacturer: Indiana University Press
- Binding: Paperback, 608 pages
- Package Dimensions:
- Dimensions: 910L x 590W x 160H
- Weight: 215
- List Price: $20.95
- ISBN: 025328029X
- ASIN: 025328029X
Buying Options
Similar Items
- Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
- The Generals' War : The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf
- Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War
- The Savage Wars Of Peace: Small Wars And The Rise Of American Power
- The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Of Ancient China (History and Warfare)
Customer Reviews
Average Amazon User Rating: ![]()
Epic.
2010-03-03
Reviewer: Graham Jenkins
As a foundational text for understanding not only American strategy, but basic concepts of national strategy itself, this book is unsurpassed. It's one of the few I can truly call "epic."
Beginning with George Washington's "strategy of attrition" during the Revolutionary War, Weigley traces the scope of American strategic thought up to the closing days of the Vietnam War. Structurally, American strategy falls into several phases. Washington eventually gives way to Halleck, who is then replaced by Ulysses Grant. Grant's approach to war - "a strategy of annihilation" - then serves as the United States' guiding principle until well into the twentieth century.
As was the case in most arenas, nukes changed everything. The beginning of the Cold War was a return to Marshall and MacArthur's styles from World War II, but that emphasis on conventional war didn't last long. Deterrence soon became the word of the day, and the strategic legacies that the army had inherited from Washington, Greene, Grant, and a host of other thinkers fell completely by the wayside.
The modern U.S. Navy is, of course, born out of the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahanian naval thought went relatively unchanged until after World War II, but the dominance of battleships remained alive and well until relatively late in the war. The Air Force gets a similar `father figure' in Billy Mitchell, and the struggle to become an independent branch of the armed services bears particular resonance now, with that very independence being questioned. The turf war between the navy and air force in the early days of the Cold War is very well-documented, with the emphasis on strategic bombers versus carrier aviation shown to be more important than a mere interservice spat.
Weigley's writing is accessible in that rarest of ways - intelligible yet sophisticated. At times he explains fairly complex concepts, but manages to avoid getting too caught up in minutiae while still covering all the important details. Thinkers in every echelon of the military get a fair hearing, from the usual generals and Joint Chiefs down to the occasional major or even captain (Boyd: curiously absent). And while the overall relevance of The American Way of War is unquestionable, the rather abrupt stopping-point of 1973 is somewhat jarring, and one wishes that Weigley had continued to examine the evolution of American strategy.
For career strategists, The American Way of War might seem oversimplified, but for everyone else, it's a perfect introduction to not just American doctrine, but national strategy as a concept. And perhaps most important, Weigley demonstrates just where we've come from, and how far we have - or haven't - come since Washington and Valley Forge.
Amazon shipping.
2009-11-04
Reviewer: Kyle Sullivan
The book itself is good, however this is the worst shipping experience i've ever had. The book was bought on Oct 4th and still (Nov 4th) is over a month late. This is the second time Amazon has done this to me with a school book that i need and i'll probably never order from here again.
A key work in military history....
2009-08-29
Reviewer: AEWHistory
This book was written by Professor Russell F. Weigley of Temple University. Although Prof. Weigley is now, unfortunately, deceased, his influence is still keenly felt through his work. The American Way of War is still assigned reading at military colleges/schools/etc. around the United States (and perhaps still abroad as well). One of Weigley's talents was to be able to synthesize complex concepts into eminently readable tomes without dumbing them down in the least. Consequently, his works remain far more accessible than those of many of his academic peers while no less intellectually weighty (in fact, often moreso). I have to admit to having a soft-spot for these sorts of historians; historians who can research, write, and teach. Prof. Weigley could do all of these and, for any who experienced him in the classroom, his mental recall was virtually photographic as well as encyclopaedic, something reflected in this work, as well as his others.
If you are looking for a solid history of the American Military, a book that is approachable, extremely well-researched, and both a current as well as a longstanding influence on military thinkers in the United States, then this is it. This book is virtually unrivalled in many categories, decades after it was published.
PS-We miss you Dr. Weigley.... RIP
Good overall.
2009-04-24
Reviewer: J. E. Day Bedford
Very good information although perhaps dated in a few areas. Served my purpose as a good resource for a thesis.
This Classic Is A Fundamental Must Read for American Military Historians
2009-03-10
Reviewer: Philip Draper
You may not agree with everything Prof. Weigley argues for in this book, but he undoubtedly produced a great scholarly work that forces subsequent historians to take his thesis into consideration when discussing the history of American armed forces. Even if you do not agree with his central argument, his book is worth the read just for the narrative of American military history. Highest recommendation.






