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A War that Went Right...Mostly 2009-02-02

Reviewer: Nicholas E. Sarantakes

Michael R. Gordon, chief defense correspondent for the "New York Times," and Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General who was a reporter for the "Times" during the first Gulf War, have written an informed account of that conflict that is fascinating and often evocative of Operation: DESERT STORM. The central players in their drama are Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney plays an important supporting role.

Gordon and Trainor present Powell as an extremely reluctant warrior who puts the institutional interests of the military before the foreign policy of the United States. He was, according to them, terrified of a repeat of the Vietnam War, where the American people blamed the uniformed services for a war that went wrong. Schwarzkopf despite his "Stormin' Norman" reputation emerges as more bark than bite. He might have abused his own staff, but he led with a light hand. He knew he had to be diplomatic with the allies and make sure that each had an important role to play, even if it upset U.S. plans or complicated military operations. He also allowed each of the other U.S. armed services to develop their own battle plans. As a result, DESERT STORM was a loosely coordinated fight rather than a strongly multi-lateral joint operation.

The strengths of this study also its weaknesses. Gordon and Trainor are defense correspondents, and while they can and do use their contacts in the Department of Defense to great advantage, they have far few in the political realm, and it shows. Secretary of state James Baker and President George Bush are almost absent from this account. Although the central thesis of this book is that the civilian leadership abdicated responsibility to the generals--hence the title--the reader needs to take this argument with a certain amount of skepticism. Gordon and Trainor make no effort to examine U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf or Middle East before this conflict, or its diplomatic impact. They also tend to exaggerate the influence of the media. Staff officers advance their plans over Schwarzkopf's objections by leading to the press and some generals owe their survival against enemies in the service due to their media coverage. Maybe, or maybe it was that they had good ideas and were competent commanders.

We could've lost this one! 2009-01-20

Reviewer: Jenny J.

So, you thought that the US really kicked butt during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm? I did -- until I read this book (required reading for a military studies course). What I had throught was a finely tuned, well oiled US political-military machine was a facade. Until reading this book, I never knew -- and thank goodness, neither (apparently) did Saddam Hussein or his cronies know -- how tenuous the early US military presence in Saudi Arabia was. I've heard it said that it's better to be lucky than good in battle; thankfully, the US forces were both lucky AND good in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Read this book if you're interested in learning the un- (or under-) reported inside history of the Gulf War.

Good Reading For Any Desert Storm Vet 2008-09-04

Reviewer: CrustyOldSarge

I was in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia)in the U.S. Army, from October '90 to August '91 as part of Desert Shield/Storm. This was the first book I've read on the subject. The ground war was so short (100 hours), and was such an anti-climax after waiting months for something to happen, that I didn't feel any book would be very good reading. This book was very good, though not great. Very revealing.
The first part of the book leading up to the air campaign kind of dragged a bit at times. It was interesting to read about the preparations at the higher levels, and the in-fighting amongst the services. Saddam Hussein's blunders early on are explained very well. I had never heard of any of these arguments before. Had Saddam waited a few months more to invade Kuwait, the U.S. military would have been in the midst of a huge drawdown in personell, and we would have had even more problems coming up with the forces to act against him. (The draw down did happen, starting in late 1991 after all the units had returned.)
The book left me with a very negative view on Colin Powell. He was willing to leave 400,000 troops sitting in the desert (99% of us who would be living in tents) for over a year waiting for economic sanctions to work. Go to Death Valley and live in a tent, General!!!
Once the air campaign starts, the book reads like a Tom Clancy novel. Very riveting.
General Schwarzkopf comes off as an egotistical hothead, and a bit of a 'screw-up'. He fails to seriously heed intelligence on the poor morale and combat effectiveness of the Iraqi troops. There also seemed to be a lot of blundering getting the ground campaign off on the right track.
Schwarzkopf was also overly generous to the Iraqi's after thier defeat. He allowed them to fly helicopters, which they used to slaughter thousands who rose up against Saddam.
General McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th Mech Division, comes off as one of the Army's best generals. To bad he wasn't in charge of the whole operation.
After reading this book I realized that this was not such a great victory as advertised. Mainly due to a very political JCS Chairman (Powell), various other politicians, and an egotistical (Jonathan Winters look alike) General Schwarzkopf, who had his memoirs planned before it was all over.
The military acronyms used might be a problem for someone never in the military, but the authors do a good job of explaining them at the outset.
There is not to much 'high tech' mumbo jumbo either. The book flows decently.

The First Gulf War: A Necessary Corrective... 2008-03-03

Reviewer: D. S. Thurlow

"The Generals' War", by correspondent Michael Gordon and retired General Bernard Trainor, is a well-researched historical account of the First Gulf War, with a focus on general officer-level decision-making. Published in 1995, the authors took full advantage of access to senior participants and declassified records to publish a necessary corrective to the triumphalism that immediately followed the end of hostilities in 1991.

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were the largest military operations conducted by the United States since the end of the Vietnam War. The operations were also a proving ground of modern weaponry and of doctrine for joint and coalition warfare. Shining a 20/20 hindsight spotlight, Gordon and Trainor found that the making of war was far messier than was advertised at the time. Rivalries between CENTCOM and the Washington Beltway hindered integrated planning, while joint conduct of the war suffered from the attempts of each of the services to carve out their own piece of the action.

The hype that accompanied the release of "The Generals' War" was a bit overdone. Few of Gordon's and Trainor's findings should be surprising to dedicated students of warfare, let alone to participants in the war itself. Wars are inherently political in planning. Execution is inherently messy and subject to all kinds of friction. For a national security structure with limited experience in the planning and conduct of war, the Bush Administration by and large did a very acceptable job. The point is well-taken that the Bush Adminstration might have done a better job of warning off Saddam from invading Kuwait prior to August 1990; it remains unknowable what if any actions might have produced different results. The point is also well-taken that the ground war was ended before the destruction of the Republican Guards, based on incomplete reporting from the battlefield. The service jostling for participation was inevitable, given the expectation that post-war budgeting would be based on wartime performance. That JCS Chief General Powell did a good job of deflecting these service pressures is to his credit.

"The Generals' War" is a very useful dissection of a complicated conflict, one that is a direct precusor to our current ways of conducting military operations. It is highly recommended to students of warfare as a detailed and generally balanced account.

Wrong Book 2007-11-03

Reviewer: quadpaws

Bought this by mistake, thought it was a diffewrent one. Will read it sometime in the futre or donate it to local library.