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Five case studies illustrating relatively "trivial" institutional factors that add up to a lot of damage 2010-07-18

Reviewer: Yoda

This book is not, unlike most books on military disasters, one that concentrates on "important" factors contributing to defeat (or almost causing it) such as intelligence failure or poor leadership or poor command and control. It instead looks at many relatively minor factors (usually institutional) that are not quite important, per se, but that add up. For example, the chapter on the near disaster of American anti-submarine warfare in early 1942 does not only concentrate on Admiral King's reluctance to institute convoys (in his opinion they were not "offensive") and the lack of anti-submarine vessels but on a myriad of factors that also contributed to the disastrous loss of shipping in that period, primarily off the U.S. coast. Such factors included lack of anti-submarine warfare training and doctrine, the lack of cooperation in the military-civilian naval communication sphere, no naval policy relating to blacking out civilian lights along coastal waterways, no military restrictions on civilian transport vessel communications (this information was to provide the Germans with considerable intelligence on shipping traffic), little coordination between the navy and coast guard regarding search and rescue, etc. The author's make the point, well, that even if the two "major" factors contributing to the disaster never occurred (i.e., the convoy system would have been introduced immediately and there were enough escort vessels) there still would have been considerable losses caused by these "minor" factors. Death of a thousand cuts so to speak. The authors also follow this same course in their analysis with regards to the four other case studies presented in their book, the British failure at Gallipoli, the surprise of Israeli forces in 1973, the defeat of the U.S. Eighth army in Korea and the French army and air force's defeat in 1940.

The serious discussion of these factors makes this book more geared to the specialist reader than the general. The general reader may find many of these "minor" factors contributing to defeat too technical or boring. The specialist reader will be more likely to appreciate a detailed discussion of them.

brilliant for war or business strategy 2009-11-29

Reviewer: David Taylor

As an ex army officer and a corporate strategist, I couldnt put this book down. what a great read with such a simple yet powerful framework backed up by some semi-quantitave analysis.

I think the authors did themselves a dis-service limiting the title to military failure when in fact the framework applies equally as 'organisational failure'. Sure the Military has the absolute imperative to win - coming second is not just loss of market share or going bankrupt - it is the death and destruction of your people and culture. As Sun Tsu said 'a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never again come into being nor the dead brought back to life'. Thus read this book before deciding how your empire will survive and thrive.

They list three basic types of failure that provide a simple yet powerful framework to assist in working through all the complexities of modern war and business.
1. failure to anticipate
2 failure to adapt
3 failure to learn
all errors can be grouped into of one these. You can survive 'singular' failures and with luck even pull thru 'aggregate' failure of two. Committing all three totals to'catastrphic failure' and 'misfortune' is sure to follow.

Now whenever I read history or look at corporate strategy, I always run thru this three part checklist to make sure we have covered off against them

good reading
david

The heterogeneity of failure 2007-11-08

Reviewer: Timothy J. Graczewski

Why do competent, well-led armies facing reasonable odds sometimes suffer spectacular defeat? That is the nettlesome question two young (at the time) professors of strategy at the US Naval War College sought to address with "Military Misfortunes."

The book is a curious and engaging mix of political science, military history and organizational theory with a dash of management consulting-style charts and decision matrices. It succeeds on a variety of levels, but most notably in its cogent critique on why previous attempts to explain military defeat have been woefully inadequate and its levelheaded view on the prospects for preventing major failure in the future. In short, this is an academic treatise on why failures occur in military organizations, not an attempt to devine formulas for preventing future failure; the authors concede that such a goal, while worthy, is essentially impossible.

To begin with, the authors highlight and dismiss the standard explanations for military failure that have most often been suggested by historians. Cohen and Gooch note that these stock explanations are nearly always homogenous in nature; that is, the cause of failure can be explained by one factor alone. Examples of these inadequate homogenous explanations are that failure is caused by the actions (or lack thereof) of an individual commander (what they call the "man-in-the-dock theory"); the inherent mental inflexibility and dullness of the typical professional military officer (the "man-on-the-couch"), the rigid conservativeness of military institutions, and ethnological defects or innate weaknesses of entire peoples and nations.

Cohen and Gooch see three very different and basic types of military failure, which can be committed at a variety of levels of command: failure to learn, failure to anticipate and failure to adapt. The combination of any two leads to what the authors call "aggregate failure" and the combination of all three lead to "catastrophic failure." To highlight each type of failure and combinations thereof, the authors' pursue a case study methodology, examining some of the most well-known military failures of the past century (the fall of France in 1940, Gallipoli in 1915, and the rout of the US VIII Army in 1950), as well as some lesser known examples (US anti-submarine warfare in 1942 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973). Each case study is briskly paced and follows the same general outline of first defining precisely what the failure under consideration was, citing the key events at each level of command that led to disaster, and then creating a matrix of actions and failures that reveal a "pathway to misfortune."

The authors concede that there are no easy remedies to curing military failure, just as there are no easy explanations for why it happens. However, they clearly see organizational dynamics as often playing a leading role on the road to misfortune. "It is the deficiency of particular organizations confronted with particular tasks that the embryo of military misfortune develops."

While there are no panaceas for preventing failures, the authors do review some ways to improve across the three general dimensions of failure: 1) learning - emphasize the importance of intellectual training and outlook combined with relentless empiricism in military education at all levels; 2) anticipation - think just as hard and realistically about the politico-military conditions under which future war could occur as about the tactics and/or weapons the other side may employ; and 3) adaptation - stress and promote the role of initiative at ever level of command.

The authors' general conclusion is gloomy, yet realistic: "misfortune lurks somewhere within the bowels of every military operation. It is 'the ghost in the machine' that can be conjured up by a variety of circumstance." In the end, "Military Misfortunes" provides a compelling framework for better understanding how and why armed forces suffer major failure, but offers little to any hope for preventing those failures from occurring in the future.

Multidimentional Relevance 2006-09-18

Reviewer: Cliff Clive

While this book deals with military failures, the paralels to running a business or a family are rich and rewarding. One example: The story of the US failure in Korea, and how certain branches of the armed forces prevailed but other failed was fascinating ... we tend to think of events as successes or failures, but really they are combinations of successes and failures -- studying in a granular, detailed way illuminates both and allows one to succeed overall by cutting failing tactics and replacing them with successful ones. Many other rich paralels here too.

Military Misfortunes the Anatomy of Failure in War 2006-03-26

Reviewer: Amir Abbas

Background

1. Title and subject. Military Misfortunes the Anatomy of Failure in War is about the failure of battle fields.

2. Author. There are two authors of this book, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch. Eliot A. Cohen is a teacher at the U.S Naval War College. He is author of two books, and these are:

(a) Citizens and Soldiers published in 1978.

(b) Commandos and Politicians published in 1990.

3. John Gooch is a military historian at the University of Lanchester England. He is author of nine books, like:

(a) Armies in Europe published in 1980.

(b) Military Deception and Strategic Surprise! Published in 1982.

4. Thesis The authors objective is to give a comprehensive look into the battle field, in which the authors have embarked on the study, by saying that the failure in battle, is not always due to genius of the winners. It can also be caused due to the military misfortunes.

5. Contents. This book consists of nine chapters, consisting of 296 pages and was published in May 1991. There are nine chapters in this book. These nine chapters can be divided into three sections. Section one, comprises of first two chapters, in which authors talks about the why misfortunes and understanding disaster. Section two, encompasses chapters from three to eight, in which the authors have discussed six wars of different periods. Last section, consists of chapter number nine and talks about, what can be done.

6. Section One. In section one, the authors tell the readers, that the military failure can be divided into three major approaches and these are:

(a) Man in the Dock. They explain, man in the dock, in terms of human error. According to the authors, one man, who is variably the commander commits, an error of judgment.

(b) The man on the Couch. The author explains this military failure, by saying, some collective way of thinking, which all generals share and for which they cannot be blamed.

(c) Collective Incompetence and the Military Mind. Authors say this military misfortune is between man in dock and the man on the couch.

7. Section Two. In this section, authors have talked about of six wars and these are:

(a) The first war, the authors talk about is the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941.

(b) The second war, the authors talk about is the American Antisubmarine Warfare in 1942, in which German U boats began an assault on coastal shipping in the immediate vicinity of the United States.

(c) The third war, the author talks about is the Israel Defense Forces on the Suez Front and the Golan Heights, 1973. During the war the authors writes that the Israel's were shocked that Arabs will attack, and were subsequently, not prepared for the attack, resulting in 2569 dead and 7500 wounded.

(d) The fourth war, the author talks about is the British at Gallipoli, August 1915. The battle took place on the Gallipoli Peninsula from 6 to 9 August 1915.

(e) The fifth war, the author talks about is the Defect of the American Eight Army in Korea, November - December 1950. The Americans were shocked that they were against well equipped Korean army, and subsequently they collapsed.

(f) The sixth and the last war the author talks about is the, French Army and the Air Force May - June 1940.

8. Section Three. This is the last chapter of the book. In this, the authors say that the causes of military misfortune are complex. They further add by saying that it is imperative to understand the nature of the problem.

9. Evaluation

(a) The author has adequately covered all the wars. They have explained the complete phase of the war. In author's opinion, the centralization of all the resources is the major factor to win the war. The land, sea, air and intelligence services must work as combined arms to win campaigns.

(b) The authors have buildup each chapter logically.

(c) In view of author the centralization is important and leaders must be willing to test ideas, old and, new rigorously and objectively to determine what works and what doesn't.